Location: Weixi western China

During Operation Dunlop UKSF successfully infiltrated a remote command complex in the Debanga mountains in Chad and confirmed the presence of Chinese military advisers embedded with Azerian state militia forces. Intelligence recovered from the site linked a small Chinese intelligence task group to the planning, targeting and operational oversight of ballistic missile strikes launched against Sudan.

Signals intelligence, captured hard drives and biometric evidence confirmed that the operation was directed by a compartmentalised unit operating from a highly restricted research and intelligence facility deep within western China. Diplomatic options have stalled, and publicly exposing the evidence risks escalating into a major international crisis.

The UK government authorises a deniable operation under the strictest compartmentalisation. Officially, the mission does not exist.

Launching from an established MSS in Burma they will infiltrate  a remote mountain valley containing an isolated intelligence and technical facility disguised as a civilian geophysical research station.

The installation sits hundreds of kilometres from major population centres and is protected by rugged terrain, electronic surveillance and a small but highly trained security detachment.

UKSF Mission Objectives:

• Disable long range communications to isolate the 

• Find Fix Finish the  intelligence personnel directing overseas operations.

• Recover digital evidence linking them to the missile campaign.

• Permanently destroy the command network supporting overseas proxy operations.

• Exfiltrate without revealing foreign military involvement.

• Gather intelligence on future overseas operations.

• Identify additional covert partners.

• Leave minimal forensic evidence.

Chinese PLA Mission Objectives:

• Security patrols.

• Observation posts.

• Thermal cameras.

• UAV surveillance flights.

• Electronic intrusion detection.

Facility Security

• Protection of Intelligence personnel.

• Rapid reaction team.

• Surveillance network.

• Hardened communications centre.

High-Value Personnel

The command cell consists of several senior intelligence officers responsible for coordinating foreign liaison, proxy-force support and technical analysis. They work from a secure operations suite protected by multiple security layers and strict compartmentalisation. And must be protected at all costs